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THE WHOLESALE EXCLUSION OF RELIGION FROM PUBLIC 
BENEFITS PROGRAMS: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RELIGION CLAUSES MUST TAKE A BACKSEAT TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
Michael J. Borger* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court, throughout its history, has routinely 
been tasked with evaluating government action that has either 
encroached upon fundamental religious liberties or has come 
dangerously close to constituting the sponsorship of a particular 
religion.1  Many of its opinions and dissents on these topics have 
been emotionally charged, conjuring up passionate viewpoints, 
contrasting ideologies, and powerful reminders of our nation’s 
turbulent origins.2  However, regardless of the justices’ differing 
opinions regarding the appropriate method to analyze religious 
controversies, these cases have made it abundantly clear that the 
 
*Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2018; B.A., 
Stony Brook University, 2014.  I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor 
Gary M. Shaw for the invaluable support and guidance that he has given me on this note. His 
drive for excellence has given me the confidence to always pursue more.  I would also like to 
thank Jessica Vogele for her superb editing and constant encouragement. Lastly, I would like 
to thank my parents, Linda and Joe, and my grandmother, Marie, for their unconditional love 
and support throughout my entire law school career. 
1 See generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that the state did not 
violate the Establishment Clause when it prohibited post-graduate theology students from 
receiving state funded scholarships even though they met the eligibility requirements for the 
program); Church of the Lukumi Babaku Aya v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (9-0 
decision) (striking down an ordinance which prohibited religious animal sacrifices because it 
violated the Free Exercise Clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the 
state violated the First Amendment when it disqualified an individual from receiving 
unemployment benefits because her religion did not permit her to work on Saturdays). 
2 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644-46 (1993) (Scalia J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s 
treatment of religion as a “jurisprudential disaster” and heavily criticizing the majority for 
downplaying the significant role that religious freedom had in the formation of this Nation) 
(emphasis added).  
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paramount concern of the Court is to ensure that the First 
Amendment is not offended by the “evils” resulting from the 
commingling of church and state, a fear that dates back to the 
founding of America.3  
Although the Supreme Court’s First Amendment religion 
clause jurisprudence has been effective in protecting these 
fundamental religious liberty interests,4 it is important not to overlook 
and undervalue other provisions of the U.S. Constitution that operate 
to safeguard an individual’s right to life and liberty as well.  In fact, 
in a sweeping effort by the Court to protect the First Amendment, 
arguments advanced by religious organizations that the state action 
violated the Equal Protection Clause typically fall by wayside, even 
when these challenges are meritorious.  The following discussion will 
help to lay the foundation for this premise.   
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is 
frequently invoked to evaluate the constitutionality of state-sponsored 
public benefits programs, where a state’s treasury department has 
been authorized to issue grants, scholarships, and other forms of 
public assistance that are funded by tax dollars.5  In the states’ effort 
to avoid potential church and state entanglement issues arising from 
these types of public benefits programs, the states’ respective statutes 
and constitutions frequently place “blanket prohibitions” on granting 
any public assistance to churches, religious organizations, or 
religiously-tied individuals due to their religious status.6  This 
“wholesale exclusion of [religion]” occurs even where these 
applicants otherwise met the program’s qualifying acceptance criteria 
and where the funds would be used for generally neutral, non-
 
3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“In the absence of precisely stated 
constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils against 
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” (quoting Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))).  
4 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (explaining that the religion clauses have 
“zealously protected [religion], sometimes even at the expense of other interests of 
admittedly high social importance”). 
5 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 715-16; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); 
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).  
6 See MO. CONST. ART. 1, § 7 (West 2016) (providing that “no money shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination 
of religion”).  
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religious purposes, such as resurfacing the playground of a daycare 
center to make it safer for the children who play on it every day.7  
In these types of situations, the First Amendment 
justifications for prohibiting religious organizations and individuals 
from participating in these programs are simply inadequate, 
especially when the states and courts concede that granting the funds 
to these organizations and individuals would not result in 
Establishment Clause concerns.8  The constitutional question must 
become whether the state is in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause when the issuing of public assistance benefits to an applicant 
would not offend the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, but 
the state still refuses to grant this assistance solely due to the 
applicant’s religious status. 
When a fundamental liberty such as religious freedom has 
been compromised by the state, and an individual has effectively 
been prevented from pursuing an interest rooted in the heart of 
American tradition, the state’s fear of potential entanglement issues 
cannot constitute a valid justification for this type of discrimination.9  
In these instances, the Equal Protection Clause must be invoked,10 
and a strict scrutiny standard must be applied to ensure that the state 
has demonstrated a compelling interest which justifies the blanket 
prohibition against religion and narrowly tailored means to achieve 
and recognize that interest.11  This author argues that the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts would be better equipped to consider 
 
7 Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
State’s latitude to discriminate against religion is confined to certain ‘historic and substantial 
state interest[s],’ and does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of religious institutions and 
their students from otherwise neutral and generally available government support”) 
(emphasis added).  
8 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779. (8th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (No. 15–577) (refusing to distribute state funds to a 
church even though it was conceded that distributing the funds would not violate the 
Establishment Clause).  
9 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (“Not all entanglements, of course, 
have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion [because] [i]nteraction between church 
and state is inevitable, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the 
two”) (internal citation omitted).  
10 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 643 (1978) (White, J., concurring) (urging the Court to 
analyze the provision of a state constitution under Equal Protection, and not the First 
Amendment, to determine whether the blanket prohibition of ministers and priests from 
running for office was constitutionally impermissible). 
11 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
that although not at issue in the case, religion would presumably be among the classifications 
deserving of heightened scrutiny) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982)).  
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these discriminatory statutes if the initial constitutional inquiry 
centered around the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and not the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
Section I of this paper will discuss Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia v. Pauley,12 a case that will be decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2017 regarding the constitutionality of a provision in the 
Missouri Constitution prohibiting a religious daycare from receiving 
a publicly funded recycled scrap-tire grant that would be used to 
resurface its playground solely due to its status as a religious 
institution.13  Section II will provide readers with an understanding of 
the importance that religious freedom played in the formation of the 
United States and will also explain the reasoning behind the Court’s 
inclination to turn to the First Amendment in all instances where 
religious issues have been presented before it.  Section III will survey 
the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  Specifically, it will 
argue that due to the Court’s inconsistent application of 
Establishment Clause tests, violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
tend to become overshadowed and ignored, permitting statutes that 
otherwise violate other provisions of the Constitution to be upheld.  
Section IV will survey the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence, 
including its criticisms, and explain why Equal Protection analyses 
would better serve the interests of challengers who have been 
discriminated against by policies that widely prohibit religious 
institutions from public assistance programs that provide generally 
available, religion-neutral benefits.  Section V will analyze Trinity 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
applying both a strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny standard to 
demonstrate that under either standard of review, the state’s “fear of 
entanglement” does not justify the deprivation of a fundamental 
liberty interest.  
II.  TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA V. PAULEY14 
Trinity Lutheran (hereinafter “Trinity”) is a church that 
expanded its Christian-based ministry services to children after 
 
12 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (No. 15–577). 
13 Id. at 782.  
14 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015). 
4
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merging with Learning Center in 1985.15  In an effort to make 
improvements to the surface area of the Learning Center’s 
playground—upgrading the existing gravel surface to a safer 
rubberized surface—Trinity Church applied for one of several 
“Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants” offered though the 
Missouri Department of Natural Resources and opened to the 
public.16  
Although Trinity was ranked fifth amongst all of the 
organizations that applied for the grant,17 it was denied the funding 
because the state determined that the distribution of aid to a religious 
organization would violate Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri 
Constitution.18  Article I, Section 7 placed an absolute prohibition on 
a state’s ability to distribute funds from the state treasury to any 
religious organization19  and did not make any exceptions, even 
where the program provided generally available, neutral benefits.20 
Trinity filed a claim in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri, challenging the constitutionality of 
Missouri’s strict prohibition against state aid to religious 
organizations.21  In its complaint, Trinity urged the district court to 
review Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution under a strict scrutiny 
standard.22  If the court adopted this standard of review, the state 
would need to demonstrate that there was a compelling state interest 
that justified the absolute ban on distributing aid to religious 
organizations.23  The state would also need to prove that the means 
adopted by the state to advance its compelling state interest were 
narrowly tailored to recognize that interest—meaning that the blanket 
prohibition against religious organizations from state aid programs 
did not sweep too broadly.24 Pauley, being sued directly in her 
 
15 Id. at 782.  
16 Id.   
17 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Trinity, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-577) (“The DNR 
criteria for ranking applications are entirely secular and neutral. . . [and] include, among 
other things, whether the application describes the project in adequate detail, includes quotes 
from at least three scrap tire vendors, and has a detailed plan for installation.”). 
18 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 782.  
19 MO. CONST. ART. 1, § 7 (West 2016). 
20 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 792 (Gruender, J., concurring).  
21 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 782.   
22 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146 
(W.D. Mo. 2013).  
23 Id. at 1155. 
24 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645 (White, J., concurring).  
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capacity as the director of the Department of Natural Resources Solid 
Waste Management Program, immediately moved for a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.25 
In its analysis of Trinity’s claims, the district court was 
guided substantially by the Supreme Court’s holding in Locke v. 
Davey,26 a decision that upheld a state statute prohibiting post-
graduate theology students from receiving state scholarship aid even 
though they met the eligibility requirements for the program.27  In 
that case, the Court held that there would be a clear Establishment 
Clause violation if students used state funds to obtain religious 
training.28  Trinity attempted to distinguish its case from Locke, citing 
to the holding in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver.29  In that 
case, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Locke as a limitation on the state’s 
ability to prohibit funding to organizations or individuals based on 
their religious status only in instances where the funds would be used 
to train clergy members and prepare them for ministry.30  However, 
despite Trinity’s efforts, the district court rejected this interpretation 
of Locke and held that it was reasonable for the state to exclude 
Trinity from the program due to its “legitimate interest in avoiding 
government entanglement with religion.”31   
The district court also emphasized the applicability of the 
Free Exercise Clause, explaining that it should be read in terms of 
what states are permitted to do, not what they are required to do.32  
Even though the court reasoned that there is some “play between the 
joints” built into the First Amendment religion clauses, it stated that 
there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that compels a state to 
distribute funds to a religious organization, even when giving the 
funds would not be in violation of the Establishment Clause.33  
 
25 Trinity, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.  
26 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a statute which prohibited post-graduate theology 
students from receiving state scholarship aid even though they met the eligibility 
requirements for the program). 
27 Id. at 717 (stating that the student had met the academic and financial requirements to 
become eligible for the state-funded scholarship).   
28 Id. at 720.  
29 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008) (limiting Locke to prohibiting the state from aiding in 
the training of clergy).  
30 Id. at 1254-56.  
31 Trinity, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
32 Id. at 1146. 
33 Id. at 1147.  
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Because the district court did not find a violation of the 
religion clause under the First Amendment, it determined that it was 
appropriate to use a rational basis test to evaluate Trinity’s Equal 
Protection claim.34  Under a rational basis standard of review, the 
State of Missouri was required to show that the prohibition against 
religious organizations from receiving public funds was rationally 
related to its legitimate interest in maintaining a strict separation of 
church and state.35  As rational basis is a low standard of review, it 
was  easily satisfied, and all of Trinity’s federal claims were 
rejected.36  After its federal claims were dismissed, Trinity advanced 
two state law claims,37 which the district court heard under its 
supplemental jurisdiction and ultimately rejected as well,38 leaving 
Trinity without any legal remedy.    
After Trinity’s case was dismissed, Trinity made a motion to 
amend its complaint to present new evidence showing that the state 
had previously granted aid to other similarly situated religious 
organizations.39  Although this newly discovered information 
arguably would “significantly alter the lawsuit’s procedural 
landscape,” and would bolster Trinity’s Equal Protection claim, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district 
court’s decision to deny the motion for being untimely.39  It then 
ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case with 
substantially similar reasoning on all of Trinity’s claims.40     
The Eighth Circuit’s decision is alarming for multiple 
reasons.  First, the court completely rejected Trinity’s Equal 
Protection argument in a single sentence with virtually no 
 
34 Id. at 1155. 
35 Trinity, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 1141 (arguing that if both clauses embedded within Article I, Section 7 were to be 
read independent of one another, the second clause prohibiting discrimination against any 
church was clearly violated by excluding Trinity from the program solely because it was a 
religious organization). 
38 Id. (holding that as a rule of statutory construction, both clauses of Article I, Section 7 
must be interpreted in harmony). 
39Trinity, 788 F.3d at 788. 
39 Id. at 788-89. 
40 Id. at 790 (holding that Trinity’s motion was not made in a timely fashion and the 
district court decided correctly).  
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explanation as to its reasoning.41  It should have explained why it was 
applying a rational basis standard of review in its Equal Protection 
analysis when the Court has traditionally treated classifications based 
on religious status as suspect, which demands strict scrutiny to be 
applied.42  Second, because the court was presented with evidence 
that other churches had received scrap-tire grants from the state, it 
should have allowed the amended complaint since this new evidence 
would have been essential to Trinity’s Equal Protection Claim and 
probably would have resulted in an outcome in Trinity’s favor.  If the 
federal courts were more inclined to analyze religious discrimination 
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as 
opposed to operating within the narrow confines of the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses, perhaps the court in this case would 
have viewed Missouri’s “wholesale exclusion” of religion through a 
more critical lens.  In doing so, it might have taken a closer look at 
Missouri’s insufficient justifications for ultimately denying children a 
safe place to play.43  
Although an argument can be made that Missouri’s 
longstanding tradition of maintaining a “high wall” between church 
and state justified the Eighth Circuit’s exclusive focus on the First 
Amendment, an even stronger argument suggests that Missouri’s 
“high wall” interest would not survive under a Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis.44  A brief survey of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence shows that it is common for courts to narrowly analyze 
religious issues under the First Amendment only, not under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Although this practice effectively prevents 
entanglement issues and the state sponsorship and endorsement of 
religion, the consequence of this narrow analysis and broad exclusion 
 
41 Id. at 788-89 (“in the absence of a valid Free Exercise or Establishment Clause claim, 
the Equal Protection Clause claim was subject to rational basis review and no compelling 
interest need be shown”). 
42 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (stating that strict scrutiny is 
applied when the law “is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as . . . religion”). 
43 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 792-93 (Gruender, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that preventing 
school children playing on a safe playground does not advance Missouri’s antiestablishment 
interest).  
44 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 784 (stating that maintaining a high wall between church and state 
has been a “bedrock principle of state law for nearly 150 years”); but see Luetkemeyer v. 
Kaufmann, 419 U.S 888, 889-90 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state’s 
interest in maintaining a strict separation of church and state will not be valid in all 
instances).  
8
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of religion from public benefits programs is that “invidious 
discrimination” against religious institutions is inevitable.45 
III.  THE ORIGINS OF OUR NATION: WHY EQUAL PROTECTION 
TAKES A BACKSEAT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S 
RELIGION CLAUSES 
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Founders recognized 
that government-sponsored religion in seventeenth-century England 
was one of the main catalysts for the American Revolution.46  By 
converting religious doctrine into the law of the land, and “[using] the 
sword” to strictly enforce regulations that had discriminatory effects 
on minority religious groups, the Church of England maintained 
control over virtually every aspect of colonial life.47  For example, if 
an individual wanted to hold public office or take a seat in 
Parliament, he was required to be ordained by a bishop of the church, 
take an oath that he affirmatively rejected religious beliefs that were 
contrary to the ruling power, and also partake in Anglican 
sacraments.48  These highly burdensome laws not only prevented men 
and women from freely exercising and celebrating their religious 
beliefs, but they also contributed to the widespread violence and 
political controversy that had plagued the early Colonies under the 
rule of the Church of England.49  
Due to these issues, religious autonomy was a primary 
concern at national political conventions after the American 
Revolution.50  While many delegates at these conventions feared that 
commingling government with religion would cause corruption 
amongst churches and religious organizations, others feared that 
religion would undermine effective government leadership.51  For a 
 
45 Harris v. McRea, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (stating that classification schemes are 
invidious when they rest on a basis that is wholly irrelevant to advancing the purpose of the 
statute and the interest of the government).   
46 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
PART III: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 650 (The Macmillan Co. eds.,1968).  
47 Id.  
48 Andrew Lynch, The Constitutional Significance of the Church of England, in LAW AND 
RELIGION: GOD, THE STATE AND THE COMMON LAW 168, 177 (Peter Radan & Denise 
Meyerson eds., 2005).  
49 SCHWARTZ, supra note 46. 
50 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES, § 12.1.1 (5th 
ed. 2015). 
51 Id.   
9
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new system of government to work, they recognized the need for an 
appropriate balance of power between all of the interests at stake.52  
First, they wanted to protect an individual’s religious freedoms from 
unjustified government intrusion because such freedoms were 
deemed essential to maintaining an ordered society.53  Second, and 
perhaps more important, they wanted to prevent government 
entanglement with any particular religion because this is exactly what 
occurred with the Church of England during the time period leading 
up to the American Revolution.54  
Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, virtually 
every state had drafted their own constitutions containing clauses that 
protected individual religious freedoms and prohibited the states from 
endorsing any religion.55  In order to convince the states to “buy in” 
to the idea of federalism and a strong centralized government, the 
Founders emphasized the importance of protecting individual 
religious freedoms at the federal level as well.56  They created the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment in 
order to protect these freedoms and also to assure that there would be 
a separation of church and state.57 
This historical backdrop helps to explain the reason why the 
First Amendment is usually the only constitutional provision at the 
forefront of the analysis when the Supreme Court is presented with a 
case involving alleged discrimination against an individual’s religion.  
In fact, in a sweeping effort to protect the First Amendment, federal 
courts will automatically conduct Establishment Clause or Free 
Exercise Clause analyses whenever they are faced with an issue that 
is remotely religious in nature, often ignoring other potential 
constitutional issues such as violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause.58  
 
52 Id.  
53 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 552 (1997). 
54 Id.  
55 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455 (1990) (noting that Connecticut was the only state to 
not have a religious freedom clause in its constitution).  
56 SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 650-51.  
57 SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 652.  
58 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring).   
10
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN 
THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC BENEFITS PROGRAMS  
The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to provide 
protection against the “sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”59  However, even 
though the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have attempted to 
“carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the 
fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society,” there has been great 
disagreement as to how to conduct an Establishment Clause analysis 
in instances where state action appears to be sponsoring or endorsing 
religion.60  Moreover, inconsistent application of Establishment 
Clause analyses essentially render the tests inadequate, especially 
when an Equal Protection analysis would provide more predictability 
to challengers of statutes alleging discrimination based on religion.   
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,61 the Supreme Court articulated what 
has become known as the “Lemon test”62—a three-prong analysis 
used to determine whether state action is valid under the 
Establishment Clause.63  The first prong of the analysis asks whether 
the statute has a secular legislative purpose.64  The second prong 
looks at whether the statute’s “principal or primary effect . . . neither 
advances nor inhibits religion.”65  The third prong asks whether the 
statute fosters “an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”66 
Justice Scalia has analogized this test to “some ghoul in a 
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after repeatedly being killed and buried.…”67  His 
main criticism is that the Court exploits the mere existence of this 
ambiguous test, invoking it whenever the Court wants to strike down 
 
59 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668, (1970). 
60 McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 
844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
61 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
62 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (referring to the test articulated in Lemon 
as the “Lemon test”).  
63 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.   
64 Id. at 612. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 613.  
67 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 
(1993) (emphasis added).  
11
Borger: The Wholesale Exclusion
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
644 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
certain state actions and ignoring it when the Court wishes to uphold 
a particular practice.68  It should be noted that although other 
Establishment Clause tests have been developed, the elements of the 
Lemon test serve as the foundational basis for the “heightened 
requirements” of subsequent versions of the test.69  
Throughout Justice Scalia’s tenure as a Supreme Court 
justice, he recognized the Court has demonstrated a “hostility to 
religion,” criticizing dissenters who have traditionally advocated for a 
very strict separation of church and state.70  This animus, however, 
might not be as prevalent as Scalia made it seem.  In one of the 
earliest Establishment Clause cases, Everson v. Board of Education,71  
the Court was asked to determine whether a New Jersey statute 
allowing private Catholic schools to reimburse parents with state 
funds for transportation costs violated the Establishment Clause.72  
The Court upheld this statute on the grounds that the state funds 
served the neutral, secular purpose of providing safe transportation to 
all children.73  As such, because the purpose was neutral and secular, 
the strict separation between church and state was not broken.74  The 
majority made it very clear that the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is to protect this separation in order to prevent the evils 
associated with commingling government with religion.75  
Although the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
evolved and expanded since Everson, uncertainty remains as to 
exactly what type of wall the Framers intended and how the Supreme 
Court should conduct Establishment Clause analyses.76  There is an 
 
68 Id.  
69 McCreary County, Kentucky, 545 U.S. at 900-901 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the majority’s articulation of the “objective observer” test for Establishment Clause 
analyses).  
70 McCreary County, Kentucky, 545 U.S. at 900; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 695 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to join the majority’s opinion because he 
believed that the City of Pawtucket was endorsing religion when it displayed its annual 
“Season’s Greetings” banner that featured a Christian nativity scene); Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (refusing to join the majority’s opinion 
because he believed that the State of Minnesota violated the Establishment Clause when it 
granted tax deductions to families with children attending religious schools for the costs of 
books).  
71 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
72 Id. at 8.  
73 Id. at 18.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.   
76 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50. 
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ongoing debate as to whether the Framers had envisioned a solid wall 
that would act as an absolute barrier to any interactions between 
church and state or whether the wall would allow for some infiltration 
and commingling.77  However, Establishment Clause cases leading 
up to and subsequently following Zobrest have demonstrated the 
Court’s willingness to accommodate religion, especially when the 
outcome of the litigation will have a significant impact on children.78  
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,79 a deaf child was 
denied his request to have a publicly employed sign language 
interpreter—a state employee whose salary was funded by a 
combination of both state and federal programs—accompany him to 
his classes at a private Roman Catholic high school.80  His request 
was made pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(“IDEA”),81 a federal statute that provided public school districts 
with funding for special education services and accommodations for 
disabled children.82  Even though the deaf child’s parents transferred 
him into a private school,83 IDEA required that the public school 
district in which the child was originally enrolled to provide the 
funding necessary for him to receive the special education services at 
the new school.84  
The Supreme Court held that there was no Establishment 
Clause violation.85  Specifically, it reasoned that “[d]isabled children, 
not sectarian schools, are the primary beneficiaries of the [Individuals 
with Disabilities Act],” which was enacted to ensure that disabled 
children receive the education for which they are entitled.86  The role 
of a sign-language interpreter was not to interject or advance her own 
religious views in the classroom but rather only to accurately convey 
 
77 CHEMERISNKY, supra note 50. 
78 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining 
whether a deaf child receiving the assistance from an interpreter who was employed by the 
state was permissible under the Establishment Clause).   
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 1192.  
81 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2016). At the time this action was commenced, the suit was brought 
under the Federal Education of the Handicapped Act which was amended and superseded by 
the Individuals with Disabilities Act. 
82 Id.  
83 Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192.  
84 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i) (2016).  
85 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993). 
86 Id. at 12-13. 
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whatever message is being said by the speaker to the disabled child.87  
The Court clearly recognized the importance of guaranteeing a 
disabled child’s right to an education because it overlooked the 
incidental commingling of church and state that took place when the 
public interpreter attended religious classes and services with the deaf 
child.88   
In declaring that the Establishment Clause “lays down no 
absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian 
school,”89 since “[s]uch a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of 
‘taint,’ would indeed exalt form over substance,”90 the Court set the 
stage for a major transition in the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  Through this powerful statement, the Court expressly 
rejected several longstanding Establishment Clause presumptions that 
the Court had historically used as guidance in its First Amendment 
analyses.91  First, the Court  made it clear that the mere presence of a 
government employee on private school grounds would no longer 
automatically constitute state sponsorship of a particular religion.92  
Absent clear evidence that the state was attempting to create a 
“symbolic link” between government and religion, the Court stated 
that this type of conduct would generally be constitutional.93  Second, 
the Court abandoned the presumption that a public employee working 
on private school grounds would be pressured by the theology in the 
surrounding environment to advance her own religious views and 
indoctrinate scripture and ideas upon the students.94  Because the 
Court assumed that a public employee working at a sectarian school 
would operate within the ethical guidelines of her profession and 
dutifully carry out all of her assigned responsibilities, the Court stated 
that, absent evidence to the contrary, the placement of a public 
 
87 Id. at 13.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.   
90 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13. 
91 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) (explaining that Zobrest made it clear that 
the Court abandoned the presumption that placing a state employee on the grounds of a 
religious institution constitutes a symbolic union of church and state prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause).  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
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employee in a sectarian school would likely be upheld as 
constitutional.95   
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the 
Establishment Clause is violated any time “a sectarian school enlists 
‘the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.’”96  He 
was concerned that the interpreter was tasked with conveying 
religious messages to the student and that the interpreter’s regular 
working environment would be “so pervaded by discussions of the 
divine, [that] the interpreter’s every gesture would be infused with 
religious significance.”97  Although the majority believed that the 
interpreter would dutifully carry out her responsibilities,98 Justice 
Blackmun argued that it was possible that over the course of the 
student’s educational career, the interpreter would build relationships 
with parochial school officials, become persuaded by theological 
messages she was conveying to the student, and possibly advance her 
own theological viewpoints.99  
However, despite his arguments that the Establishment Clause 
was violated in this case, Justice Blackmun did concede that “[w]hen 
government dispenses public funds to individuals who employ them 
to finance private choices, it is difficult to argue that government is 
actually endorsing religion.”100  This statement makes it difficult to 
reconcile Blackmun’s overall dissent in this case.  Arguably, there is 
virtually no difference between a program where the government 
gives direct aid to religiously affiliated schools and a program where 
the government gives the same exact financial aid to private 
individuals, enabling them to use the aid towards tuition costs at the 
very schools the government was not allowed to provide funding for 
in the first place. 
After Zobrest, the Court continued to emphasize that a clear 
distinction must be made between state programs that provide 
funding directly to religious organizations and programs that 
distribute funds indirectly to sectarian schools through students to be 
 
95 Id.   
96 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 592 (1992)). 
98 Id. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. at 13.  
99 Id. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. 
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used for tuition, books, and transportation expenses.101  For example, 
the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris102 held that a voucher 
program that provided financial assistance to low-income families to 
help fund their children’s education at private parochial schools did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.103  Here, the State of Ohio 
initiated the program to give parents the opportunity to send their 
children to private schools that significantly outperformed the inner-
city public schools.104  The issue facing the Court was that over 
eighty percent of the vouchers were used for tuition at religiously 
affiliated schools, prompting opponents of the program to argue that 
the vouchers violated the Establishment Clause.105   
In upholding the voucher program as constitutional, the Court 
reasoned that even though many families were using the state aid to 
fund their children’s education at parochial schools, the program 
itself was entirely neutral and neither favored nor disfavored any type 
of religion.106  In fact, the only criteria used to determine which 
families were eligible for the funding was their household income.107  
The majority reached its desired outcome by reasoning that the state 
was acting with the important secular purpose of providing the best 
possible education for the inner-city children.108 
These conclusions fall directly in line with Justice Scalia’s 
view that the Court will ignore the traditional Establishment Clause 
tests—for better or worse—whenever it wishes to reach a desirable 
result.109  In all, this backdrop of Establishment Clause cases makes it 
difficult to reconcile instances, such as Trinity, where the federal 
courts have refused to grant constitutional relief to claimants that 
were denied government funding solely because of their religious 
status, even though it was conceded that providing the funding to the 
 
101 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (allowing the state to give 
financial assistance to low-income families to help them pay for tuition at higher performing 
parochial schools).  
102 Id.   
103 Id. at 643-44.  
104 Id. at 644.  
105 Id. at 646-47.  
106 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653.  
107 Id. at 640 (“The only preference in the program is for low-income families, who 
receive greater assistance and have priority for admission”).  
108 Id. at 640 (“[T]he program was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing 
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system”).  
109 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398.  
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church would not be an Establishment Clause violation.110  In these 
instances, it appears that the courts are attempting to circumvent 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analyses in an effort to 
maintain the strict separation of church and state advocated for by the 
Founders and many of the Supreme Court justices.  As discussed 
below, even when there are First Amendment rights at stake in cases 
centered around religious issues, there is a strong argument to be 
made that a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis would 
be much more effective in providing justice to all parties. 
V.  THE ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL PROTECTION: WHY THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT MUST BE INVOKED WHEN THE 
STATE PLACES BLANKET PROHIBITIONS ON RELIGION 
A.  Setting the Stage for a Shift Towards Equal 
Protection  
The proposition of shifting to an Equal Protection analysis in 
instances where the state places blanket prohibitions on religion 
might appear to disturb the longstanding tradition of the Court to 
focus narrowly on the First Amendment religion clauses whenever 
Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause issues arise.  However, 
a shift towards making the Equal Protection Clause the primary 
means to evaluate these types of cases is a concept that has received 
some support by Justice White.  In fact, in his concurring opinion in 
McDaniel v. Paty,111 White saw only an Equal Protection issue when 
presented with a provision of the Tennessee Constitution placing a 
blanket prohibition on ministers and priests of any denomination 
from serving as delegates in the Tennessee’s constitutional 
convention.112  Although the plurality of the Court held that this 
provision violated the protections afforded by the First Amendment 
 
110 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 784 (“[I]t now seems rather clear that Missouri could include the 
Learning Center’s Playground in a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire grant program without 
violating the Establishment Clause”) (emphasis added); See also Locke v. Davey. 540 U.S. 
712 (2004) (holding that a state is not required to fund a scholarship to an individual that 
would have used the funds to pursue a degree in theology, even though funding the 
scholarship would not have been in violation of the Establishment Clause”).  
111 435 U.S. 618 (1978).  
112 Id. at 621.  
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religion clauses,113 Justice White did not see such an encroachment 
on a minister’s right to freely exercise his religious beliefs.114   
Instead of engaging in a First Amendment analysis, White 
made the argument that the Court should have evaluated this case 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.115  He 
argued that a constitutional provision which disqualifies all religious 
clergy members from running for public office sets forth a 
classification scheme which is both underinclusive and overinclusive 
at the same time, failing to advance the purpose of the provision and 
the legitimate interests of the state.116  Even though Tennessee 
attempted to justify its absolute prohibition on clergy members from 
taking a seat in public office based on its interest in maintaining a 
strict separation between church and state, it recognized that not all 
clergy members running for office would allow their religious 
commitments and beliefs interfere with the duties owed to their 
constituents.117  Additionally, this wholesale exclusion of ministers 
and priests from holding legislative positions swept too broadly, 
depriving qualified clergy members of their interest in gaining ballot 
access—an important individual right that requires a “substantial 
justification” by the state in depriving a class of persons from the 
opportunity to run for public office.118 Although Justice White urged 
the Court to evaluate this type of absolute prohibition under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Free Exercise or Establishment 
Clauses under the First Amendment as discussed by the majority, he 
did not articulate a fully comprehensive framework for analysis that 
would provide consistency in deciding future cases.119  
To understand how the Court should engage in Equal 
Protection analyses in these situations, it is first necessary to explain 
 
113 Id. at 627-29 (holding that this provision forced clergy members who wanted to run for 
office to surrender their religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment).  
114 Id. at 643-44 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that this constitutional provision in no 
way interfered with the minister’s free exercise of his religion).  
115 Id. at 643.  
116 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645. (explaining that the state does have an interest in ensuring 
that elected members of the clergy did not allow their religious obligations to interfere with 
the duties owed to the constituents who elected them).  
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 643-45. 
119 Id. at 644-45 (explaining that the Court’s analysis should have focused on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but did not identify the level of scrutiny 
to apply to discrimination based on religion).  
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how its Equal Protection jurisprudence has developed over time.  
This discussion is critical to determine which standard of review the 
Court should adopt if it were to analyze Trinity as well as future 
religious discrimination cases under an Equal Protection analysis 
instead of the First Amendment religion clauses.  In discussing how 
to treat Trinity’s Equal Protection claim, the Court must distinguish 
this case from the existing caselaw which has been limited to 
situations where the state’s discrimination has only been amongst 
similarly situated religious organizations.  This is a critical 
distinction because there are virtually no cases where the Supreme 
Court has invoked an Equal Protection analysis to evaluate state 
action that has discriminated against similarly situated religious and 
non-religious organizations in determining qualification criteria for 
generally available, public benefits programs administered by state 
agencies.  It is therefore necessary to survey the evolution of the 
Equal Protection Clause to determine where classifications based 
entirely on religion fit within the several tiers of scrutiny already 
established by the Court.  
B.  The Origins, Evolution, and Criticisms of the 
Equal Protection Framework 
The critical language of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
straightforward, as it commands that “[no state shall] . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”120  
Because the language is seemingly all-encompassing, a common 
misconception of the Equal Protection Clause is that an individual’s 
constitutional rights are unequivocally violated whenever he or she is 
subjected to unequal treatment.121  However, this is simply not true, 
as claimants who wish to successfully invoke Equal Protection carry 
the burden of establishing the existence of discriminatory state action 
and the state’s intent to discriminate in enacting or carrying out its 
 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
121 Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (holding that even though there were 
inferences of discrimination, “appellants have not shown that the challenged part of the New 
York Act was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of 
origin”); J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 
2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 56 (2002) (arguing that journalists following the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks were under a “misconception” that any racial profiling for any 
reason would constitute a per se violation of Equal Protection). 
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legislation.122  In other words, it is not enough to show only disparate 
impact—purposeful state discrimination must be proven as well.123   
In the context of state action, it is important to distinguish 
between acceptable discrimination and unconstitutional 
discrimination, as virtually every state law discriminates against 
individuals to some extent.124  Discrimination simply means that a 
law treats different groups of people in a different way, often by 
merely placing individuals into different classifications for legitimate 
and constitutional reasons.125  In most instances, these distinctions are 
necessary for the state to fully protect its citizens.126  For example, 
when a state enacts legislation that sets forth the minimum age to 
negotiate and enter into a binding contract, purchase alcoholic 
beverages, or collect retirement benefits, it may constitutionally treat 
minors differently than individuals who have reached the age of 
majority.127  These types of discriminatory legislation are generally 
upheld so long as the state can assert that at least some sort of 
legitimate state interest is served when it treats these different age 
groups differently and that the regulation is rationally related to that 
state interest.128  For example, the enforcement of a minimum 
drinking age is a legitimate state interest because it maintains safer 
roadways and helps teenagers stay healthy and avoid alcohol-related 
medical problems that would eventually put a drain on state 
resources.129  Similarly, the states have a legitimate interest in 
maintaining control over who is eligible to receive retirement benefits 
to ensure that the program is well-funded and self-sustaining.130  
Enacting legislation which sets forth a minimum age for drinking or 
 
122 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that 
under an Equal Protection analysis, “prima facie challenges are rebuttable by proof of 
absence of intent to discriminate”).  
123 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).  
124 John F. Niblock, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 
UCLA. L. REV. 153, 164 (1993).   
125 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 109 
(1976). 
126 Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 
103 (2014). 
127 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at § 9.1.2.   
128 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 346 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure 
was a rational way to correct it”). 
129 Williamson, 346 U.S. at 488 (giving substantial deference to the state legislature under 
rational relation). 
130 Id.  
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retirement benefits is rationally related to the advancement of these 
legitimate state interests.131  Equal Protection requires similarly 
situated classes of individuals to be treated exactly the same—
meaning that no class of minors is exempt from the state’s minimum 
drinking age and all citizens must wait until they reach the state’s 
retirement age before they are capable of receiving benefits.132  So 
long as that criteria is satisfied, the discriminatory treatment will not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.133  
C.  Slaughter-House Cases and the Original 
Framework for Equal Protection Analyses 
Only four years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified 
in 1868,134 the Supreme Court decided a series of cases collectively 
referred to as the “Slaughter-House Cases.”135  In these cases, the city 
of New Orleans enacted legislation incorporating and monopolizing 
the city’s slaughterhouse and butcher shop industry.136  This 
legislation resulted in a single corporation controlling virtually every 
aspect of the trade, forcing butchers and private operators of 
slaughter-houses to comply with the corporation’s high fees and be 
subject to harsh penalties if they violated the new legislation.137  The 
Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans argued that the 
legislation was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
granted one group of individuals the exclusive rights to operate 
slaughter-houses but prohibited individuals already in the industry 
from continuing their business.138  The Court held that there was no 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it could not fathom 
its application outside the realm of racial discrimination against 
newly freed African American slaves post-Civil War.139  Specifically, 
the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause was “so clearly a 
 
131 Id.  
132 See generally Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 581 (2011). 
133 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at § 9.1.2.  
134 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
135 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
136 Id. at 39.  
137 Id. at 40.  
138 Id. at 50.  
139 Id. at 81.  
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provision for [the African American race] . . . that a strong case 
would be necessary for its application to any other.”140   
However, since the Slaughter-House Cases, the framework of 
the Fourteenth Amendment has evolved substantially.  As discussed 
in greater detail below, not only does the Equal Protection Clause 
protect classes of individuals based on race, but it also now provides 
protection against discrimination based on age, sex, gender, national 
origin, and even non-suspect classes as well.141 Once the Supreme 
Court classifies and categorizes the individuals subjected to state 
action, it then decides the applicable level of scrutiny to apply to the 
enacted statute to determine the constitutionality of the law.  
D.  Defining Suspect Classes and Applying Strict 
Scrutiny  
It is well established that if a state enacts legislation that is 
discriminatory on its face against a suspect class, it will most likely 
be struck down by the Court as unconstitutional.142  A suspect class is 
one that has been “subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”143  It also includes individuals who have historically been 
subjected to stereotypes that wrongfully undermine their abilities.144  
For example, when statutes make classifications based on race, 
national origin, and alienage, these types of classifications are 
“inherently suspect” and are subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny 
standard of review.145   
Under strict scrutiny, the Court will first ask whether the state 
enacted legislation is “necessary to achieve . . . [the] compelling 
interest.”146  It will then ask whether the means are “narrowly 
tailored” to achieve the government’s “asserted purpose,” as applied 
 
140 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.  
141 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at § 9.1.3. 
142 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969) (holding that any legislation that 
makes explicit racial classification are subject to the most rigid scrutiny).   
143 San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).  
144 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).  
145 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).  
146 Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 
AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 355, 360 (2006).  
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to individuals that are similarly situated.147  If the Court applies a 
strict scrutiny standard to a state law, the burden is on the state to 
prove that its law meets the standard.148  The likelihood that a state 
will be successful in overcoming its burden is low, as empirical 
studies show that a mere thirty percent of state statutes survive under 
this standard of review.149  Although the above description is a 
current articulation of the strict scrutiny analysis, it took well over a 
century for the Supreme Court to develop this standard of review.  
As the Slaughter-House Cases made clear, the original 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
language was strictly a prohibition against the hostile treatment of 
former African American slaves.150  However, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and understanding of the Equal Protection Clause did 
not lead to the actual equal treatment of African Americans.  In fact, 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Plessy v. Ferguson151 established that 
“separate but equal” was the law of the land, mandating that similarly 
situated whites and blacks must travel on separate train cars, eat in 
different sections of restaurants, and even drink from separate water 
fountains.152  “Separate but equal” policies were not viewed as 
discrimination because the Supreme Court had an exceptionally 
narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment.153  It would take over 
forty years before the Court began to recognize the need for a 
heightened level of judicial inquiry.154   
Interestingly enough, in a 1938 case involving a controversy 
over an interstate ban against shipping condensed skimmed milk,155 
Justice Harlan Stone would pen what would become known as one of 
the most famous footnotes in the Supreme Court’s illustrious 
history.156  In United States v. Carolene Products,157 the majority held 
 
147 Id.   
148 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).  
149 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Court, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006).  
150 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.  
151 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
152 U.S. v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590, 592 (M.D. Ala. 1962) 
153 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judicial Activism, Judge’s Speech, and Merit Selection: 
Conventional Wisdom and Nonsense, 68 ALB. L. REV. 557, 570 (2005). 
154 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
155 Id. at 146.  
156 Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products 
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004).  
157 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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that it would operate under the presumption that lawmakers have a 
rational basis whenever they enact economic regulations.158  To 
overcome this presumption, the plaintiff would have to prove the 
existence of prejudice either through an attack on the statute’s facial 
validity or through its operation.159  Otherwise, the Court would 
conduct no further inquiry.160  In Footnote Four, the Court declared 
that the role of the judiciary is to determine “whether prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”161  The footnote made it clear that in order to maintain the 
integrity of the American political process, and to promote a true 
democratic system, there must be significant protection afforded to 
members of “suspect-classes” who have no voice to protect their own 
rights.162  Because Carolene Products involved mere economic 
regulations and not “discrete and insular minorities,” a more 
searching judicial inquiry was unnecessary.163  Regardless of the 
actual holding in this case, Footnote Four demonstrated the Court’s 
increasing concern to protect underserved individuals in the 
American political system.164 
Several years later and in the midst of World War II, the 
Supreme Court struggled in deciding Korematsu v. United States,165 a 
case that asked whether relocating Japanese Americans into detention 
centers during wartime violated the protections granted to these 
citizens by the United States Constitution.166  Fearful that these 
citizens were disloyal and would commit acts of espionage to help 
aid Japan’s war effort against American forces, the United States 
military performed a mass evacuation of all Japanese Americans 
 
158 Id. at 152. 
159 Id. at 153-54.  
160 Id. at 153.  
161 Id. at 152 n.4. 
162 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, BASIC READINGS IN U.S. DEMOCRACY IV 34 (Melvin I. Urofsky 
ed., 1994). 
163 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.  
164 Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the “Insider-Outsider,” 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1986). 
165 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
166 Id. at 217-18.  
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without a screening process.167  Although the Court held that this type 
of disparaging treatment was deemed necessary and acceptable 
during a time of war and national emergency, this decision ultimately 
articulated a rendition of what would become known as the current 
strict scrutiny standard.168   
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, began his opinion 
by stating that “[a]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect.169  That is not to say 
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.170  It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”171  Although the 
Supreme Court did not define this standard of review as “strict 
scrutiny,” it clearly identified that there was a need to ensure that 
enacted legislation did not single out specific racial groups or 
interfere with their civil liberties.172  
Once the Court fully recognized that there was a substantial 
need to protect discrete and insular minorities who were not afforded 
recourse in the political system, the principle underlying the need for 
heightened scrutiny was used to abolish “separate but equal” 
mandates for public facilities and segregation in public school 
districts173  and was used in cases involving national origin,174 and 
affirmative action as well.175  However, following the articulation of 
this heightened standard of review, it is important to note that not 
every class of individuals will be categorized as suspect and not 
every legislative act that has a resulting discriminatory effect on 
individuals will be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.  
Therefore, the Court must carefully determine the appropriate 
standard of review to be used on a case-by-case basis, applying 
 
167 Id. at 218-21.  
168 Id. at 216.  
169 Id.  
170 Korematsu, 233 U.S. at 216. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 219-20.  
173 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).  
174 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2005) (applying a strict-scrutiny standard 
of review to analyze state prison policy which required prisoners of the same national origin 
and race to be segregated from one another in an effort to prevent gang violence in the 
prison).  
175 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209-2210 (2016) (holding 
that the university had a continuing obligation to satisfy a strict-scrutiny constitutional 
inquiry when evaluating its admissions standards that included an affirmative action policy).  
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existing case law and precedent based on the specific issues that are 
presented before the them.176  
E.  Rational Basis Standard of Review 
Even when governmental interests do not implicate a suspect 
class, the Supreme Court will still conduct an Equal Protection 
analysis using a lower standard of review to determine whether the 
state-enacted statute unjustly distinguishes between classifications of 
persons or businesses.177   
It is common for states to enact legislation that places 
individuals into different classifications based on their age, wealth, 
sexual orientation, or disability status.178  It is also common for states 
to implement economic regulations in an effort to control and 
standardize the different types of businesses permitted to operate in 
their jurisdictions.179  The government justifies this unequal treatment 
of individuals and businesses by arguing that it is necessary for 
carrying out legitimate state interests, such as determining an 
individual’s eligibility for certain government programs, creating 
more efficient government hiring procedures, and maintaining well-
regulated business districts.180  Because these types of classifications 
 
176 Michael J. Bartlett, Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans: 
Education, a Fundamental Element of Liberty, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 595, 613 (1995) (“The 
choice regarding which standard to apply is the most important aspect of any equal 
protection challenge because of the great disparity in protection available through each 
[standard of review]”). 
177 See generally Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88. 
178 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991) (holding that a mandatory 
retirement age for state judges was valid under rational basis because age is not a 
classification deserving of heightened protection); City of Cleburne, Texas, 473 U.S. 432, 
446 (1985) (refusing to apply a heightened standard of review of a classification of mentally 
incompetent individuals); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (holding that a 
standard court filing fee did not warrant a heightened level of review even though it was 
argued that it gave wealthy individuals easier access to the courts than poor individuals).   
179 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding an ordinance which 
denied certain food vendors the ability to obtain permits that would allow them to operate in 
an historic tourist attraction).  
180 Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 471 (justifying mandatory retirement because it “increases the 
opportunity for qualified persons . . . to share in the judiciary and permits an orderly attrition 
through retirement”); City of Cleburne, Texas, 473 U.S. at 449-50 (holding that the 
classification of the mentally ill did not require heightened scrutiny but striking down a 
zoning regulation for failing to satisfy rational basis); Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 (justifying 
the lower standard of review because no suspect class was present and the state court system 
implementation of standardized filing fees was rationally related to its purpose of covering 
operating expenses).  
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are not considered to be suspect by the Court, they are challenged 
under a much less stringent standard of review known as rational 
basis which gives the state legislature a tremendous amount of 
deference.181  
When a rational basis standard of review is applied, the 
burden is placed on the plaintiff challenging the legislation to prove 
that the law does not serve any conceivably legitimate purpose and 
that the law bears no rational relation to achieving that interest.182  
However, the plaintiff faces an uphill battle to satisfy this burden 
because a tremendous amount of deference is given to the state in 
these types of cases.183  In fact, when this standard of review is 
applied, the state will virtually always win unless the law 
demonstrates a “clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.”184 
For example, in 1955, the Supreme Court in Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Oklahoma185 upheld a state statute authorizing 
licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists to fit prescription 
lenses.186  The Court held that the state’s interest in restricting the 
care of eyes to licensed professionals advanced the public’s health 
and did not rise to the level of “invidious discrimination.”187  
Common with cases utilizing the rational basis standard of review, 
the Supreme Court gave deference to the legislature and held that it 
was not the Court’s role to interpret the logic behind the bill, just the 
constitutionality.188 
In 1976, the Supreme Court in City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes189 upheld a New Orleans ordinance prohibiting hot dog cart 
vendors from obtaining permits to continue their business in the 
 
181 Id.  
182 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (stating that 
under rational basis, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that “she has been intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment”).  
183 Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (explaining that under a traditional rational basis standard of 
review, the Court give a tremendous amount of deference to the legislature in presuming that 
the enactment is constitutionally valid).  
184 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (stating that under rational basis 
review, state laws are given a “presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a 
clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality”). 
185 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
186 Id. at 487.  
187 Id. at 489.  
188 Id. at 487.  
189 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
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historic Vieux Carre French Quarter if they had been in operation for 
less than eight years and “grandfather[ing]” vendors of the same food 
products who had been conducting business for over eight years.190  
In determining whether this statute was in violation of Equal 
Protection, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nless a classification 
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently 
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions 
presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and 
require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.”191  Here, the legitimate state interest was 
preserving the appearance and historic culture of this highly 
trafficked tourist attraction.192  The law rationally related to the 
state’s interest in preserving this historic culture because experienced, 
longstanding vendors helped to maintain the consistency, order, and 
culture that made the city a famous tourist attraction in the first 
place.193  
Although rational basis has been consistently applied by the 
Court, its major criticism is that the test doesn’t have enough “bite,” 
giving far too much deference to the legislature and allowing the 
justices to avoid any real inquiry into the actual purpose of the 
legislation.194 Furthermore, in instances where the statute in question 
does not encroach upon discriminating against a suspect class, 
rational basis does not always provide an appropriate level of scrutiny 
to ensure that individuals are receiving the protections afforded to 
them by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.195  This need for a more exacting level of scrutiny led to 
the articulation of the intermediate standard of review.  
 
190 Id. at 298-99.  
191 Id. at 303.  
192 Id. at 300.  
193 Id. at 304 (explaining that the city had a legitimate interest in preventing “peddlers and 
hawkers” from interfering with the charm that this tourist attraction has historically 
maintained).  
194 United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980) 
(explaining that under rational basis, “the plain language of the [statute] marks the beginning 
and end of inquiry” in its purpose).   
195 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 
(1996) (explaining that the modern Fourteenth Amendment framework has provided stability 
and predictability in analyzing Equal Protection claims). 
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F.  Intermediate Scrutiny Standard of Review 
For rational basis and strict scrutiny standards of review, the 
Supreme Court, as well as commentators and legal scholars, are 
generally satisfied with the existing framework of analyses.196  
However, there are conflicting views as to how to conduct a scrutiny 
analysis for quasi-suspect classes, such as sex, gender, and 
illegitimate children.197  
The Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed198  invalidated an 
intestacy statute on the basis of sex discrimination because it gave 
preference to males over females when there was a tie as to who 
would become the administrator of a decedent’s estate.199  The Court 
adhered to the rational basis test and refused to adopt a heightened 
level of scrutiny for sex, even though its analysis indicated that it 
regarded sex as deserving of more protection than a rational basis 
standard would afford.200 By invoking language that described the 
legislation as “arbitrary” and lacking a “fair and substantial relation” 
to the interests advanced by the legislation, it was clear that the Court 
hinted at adopting a stricter standard of review for sex 
classifications.201    
Surly enough, just two years later in Frontiero v. 
Richardson,202 the Supreme Court a plurality of justices drafted an 
opinion which held that classifications deserved a heightened level of 
scrutiny because sex is an “immutable characteristic determined 
solely by birth” and discrimination based on this characteristic has no 
justification in society.203  In this case, the plurality appeared to 
advocate for a level of scrutiny consistent with strict scrutiny, but it 
did not actually articulate a precise test yet.204   
After years of debate and lack of consensus among the 
Supreme Court justices as to how to treat sex discrimination, the 
 
196 Id.   
197 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 469-70 (Marshal, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court for 
not applying a heightened standard of review for certain classifications).  
198 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
199 Id. at 73.  
200 Id. at 76. 
201 Id. at 76-77.  
202 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
203 Id. at 686-88. 
204 Id. (addressing the issues which arise in classifying individuals based on sex, but not 
explaining how to treat individuals who have changed their natural born sex characteristics 
though advancements in medical technology).  
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Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren205 articulated what is now known as 
the “intermediate scrutiny test.”206  This test requires that any law 
discriminating on the basis of sex “must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”207  Although the Court rejected 
“archaic and overbroad generalizations” of gender roles in the home 
and at the work place, it refused to use strict scrutiny for sex 
discrimination cases because it was hesitant to classify sex as a 
suspect class on the same level as race.208  It recognized that there are 
factual scenarios where it might be appropriate to treat males and 
females differently whereas there are no scenarios where it is 
appropriate to treat blacks and whites differently.209  Although the 
Court did not provide specific examples of when sex classifications 
would be appropriate, it expressly rejected invidious sex 
discrimination based on outdated stereotypes and distorted 
statistics.210  
In Craig, the majority struck down an Oklahoma statute 
allowing females to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages at the 
age of eighteen but not males.211  The Court held that even with the 
evidentiary and statistical findings that demonstrated a correlation 
between sex and traffic safety, it was not satisfied that “sex 
represent[ed] a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of 
drinking and driving.”212 Based on the evidence provided by the state 
legislature, it was clear that the important government objective was 
keeping the roadways safe and reducing injury and death caused by 
drunk driving.213  However, the Court found that the application of 
different minimum drinking ages to men and woman was not 
substantially related to achieving that objective because this statute 
only advanced antiquated stereotypes of traditional gender roles.214  
 
205 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
206 Id. at 197.  
207 Id.   
208 Id. at 198-99.  
209 Id. at 199.  
210 Craig, 429 U.S. at 224 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).  
211 Id. at 204.  
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 200-201.  
214 Id. at 208-209. 
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G.  Justices Have Criticized the Application of Equal 
Protection Tests. 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Craig v. Boren is 
just one example of an onslaught of criticism towards the Court’s 
Equal Protection jurisprudence.215  He argued that that the majority 
created intermediate scrutiny entirely “out of thin air,” as there was 
absolutely no language in the Fourteenth Amendment to support the 
creation of such a standard of review.216  Since there were already 
two Equal Protection tests—rational basis and strict scrutiny—that 
were historically misused and misapplied, he argued that the creation 
of a middle ground test would do nothing but burden the Court’s 
already difficult framework for Equal Protection analyses.217 
Justice Marshall’s scathingly criticized Equal Protection 
jurisprudence in his dissenting opinion in City of Cleburne, Texas v. 
Cleburne Living Center.218  He chided the Court for placing too much 
emphasis on determining which standard of review to apply to a 
particular case rather than making a “careful identification of the 
interest at stake and the extent to which society recognizes the 
classification as an invidious one.”219  In this case, he criticized the 
majority for not applying a heightened standard of review for a 
statute that discriminated against the mentally handicapped.220  He 
called the majority out for “downplay[ing] the lengthy ‘history of 
purposeful unequal treatment’” of the mentally ill221 and argued that 
the Court had a duty to ensure that the mentally ill were able to 
overcome the barriers imposed by society that are “inconsistent with 
evolving principles of equality embedded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”222 
Justice Stevens also weighed in on the Equal Protection 
jurisprudence discussion on several occasions.223  Specifically, he has 
 
215 Craig, 429 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
216 Id. at 220.  
217 Id. at 220-21. 
218 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  
219 Id. at 478.  
220 Id. at 470-71. 
221 Id. at 465.  
222 Id. at 467.  
223 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-55 (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-14 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  
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argued that the case law does not provide a consistent Equal 
Protection standard but instead sets forth a “continuum of judgmental 
responses to differing classifications which have been explained in 
opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one extreme to 
‘rational basis’ at the other.”224 Furthermore, he has argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not give freedom to the Court to pick 
and choose which standard of review to apply in a particular case, as 
this would constitute an unprecedented “double standard.” 225  As 
Justice Stevens emphasized, “[t]here is only one Equal Protection 
Clause.226 
Perhaps the most aggressive attack on the Court’s Equal 
Protection jurisprudence was enshrined in Justice Thomas’s recent 
dissent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,227 in which he 
expressly accused the majority of engaging in intellectual dishonesty 
in its analysis.228  Thomas referred to each standard of review 
articulated by the Court—whether it be rational basis, intermediate 
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny—as “made up” and “meaningless 
formalism[s]”, criticizing the Court for purporting to analyze a case 
under a particular standard, but “tinker[ing] with the level of scrutiny 
to achieve its desired result.”229  He argued that this type of conduct is 
a mere pretense which masks the Court’s true underlying policy 
objectives.230  
H.  Summary of Equal Protection and Determining an 
Appropriate Standard of Review for Religion-
Based Classifications in Public Benefits Programs  
These jarring dissents discussed above raise a number of 
concerns surrounding the current state of the Court’s Equal 
Protection jurisprudence—most importantly, its overall adequacy for 
determining whether the challenged discrimination is impermissible 
under the Constitution.  However, despite some apparent 
inconsistencies of its application and the criticisms expressed by 
several dissenting justices, the current Fourteenth Amendment 
 
224 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451.  
225 Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12. 
226 Id. at 211. 
227 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
228 Id. at 2327 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
229 Id. at 2326-27.  
230 Id. at 2328.  
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framework has provided a degree of stability and predictability in 
determining how the Court will decide a particular case.231 Absent 
from this discussion, however, is guidance as to how the Court will 
treat classifications that are based purely on religious belief or status.  
Since religion is an internal belief that in no way affects the outward 
capabilities of two similarly situated individuals of different faiths, it 
is arguable that at least some form of heightened scrutiny should be 
applied by the Court when evaluating state action that discriminates 
solely on the basis of religion.  Invoking a heightened level of 
scrutiny is especially necessary when evaluating state action that sets 
up a qualification scheme for generally available public benefits 
programs, and when it is conceded by the state that the classification 
scheme is not necessary for the purposes of satisfying the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses.  In these situations, the state’s attempt 
to justify discriminating against religion on the grounds that is 
attempting to avoid impermissible entanglement issues is meritless.  
VI.  ANALYZING TRINITY UNDER AN EQUAL PROTECTION 
FRAMEWORK 
A.  Overview 
As discussed in the preceding sections, Zelman, Zobrest and 
Everson have made it clear that the Court’s decisions involving 
religious issues have evolved over time to become more accepting of 
the reality that not all interactions between church and state are 
impermissible, especially when the sole beneficiaries of the 
challenged action are innocent children seeking to enrich their 
educational opportunities at parochial schools.232 In fact, the Court 
has routinely overlooked potential entanglement issues involving 
state action that provide benefits to disabled children and low income 
children attending these religiously affiliated schools.233  But if the 
Court determines that states are now constitutionally permitted to 
exclude religious institutions from participating in a benefits 
program, such as a scrap tire recycling program, solely because of 
their religious status, this would appear to signal a drastic shift in the 
Court’s religion cases by advocating for an even stricter separation of 
 
231 Sunstein, supra note 195. 
232 See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.  
233 Id.  
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church and state.  If this is the case, there is no type of public benefits 
program where the state would not be able to discriminate against 
religion—even if the challenged program would help a deaf child 
attending a parochial school gain access to a state-employed sign 
language interpreter.234  These overtones of religious hostility are the 
catalyst for the state’s potentially invidious discrimination, which is 
why the Court must address this action under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.235   
Even though the State of Missouri and the lower courts 
conceded that distributing the funds from the scrap tire program to 
Trinity would not violate the Establishment Clause, and withholding 
the funds would not violate the Free Exercise Clause,236 this does not 
mean that violations of the Fourteenth Amendment simply fall by the 
wayside.237   
Where First Amendment issues invoke the Court’s paramount 
concern of preventing an impermissible commingling of church and 
state, Equal Protection triggers the Court’s judicial instinct to 
preserve fundamental liberty interests of similarly situated citizens.239  
Although different classifications require varying standards of 
judicial scrutiny, when it comes to classes other than age, wealth, 
sexual orientation, disability, or economic regulations, there is at least 
some heightened burden placed on the state to justify its disparaging 
treatment of these particular classes, including religion-based 
classifications.238  It is unclear whether the Court would adopt an 
intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or another hybrid standard that 
combines elements from both of these tests in evaluating Trinity’s 
Equal Protection claim, but as explained below, it is certain that 
 
234 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14.  
235 See Church of the Lukumi Babaku Aya, 508 U.S. at 524-26 (discussing the targeted 
action the legislature took at the Santeria church to prohibit members from participating in 
religious ceremonies which the surrounding community found offensive); see also 
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring) (urging the Court to evaluate a provision 
which placed a blanket prohibition on religion to be reviewed under the Equal Protection 
Clause, and not the First Amendment).  
236 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 784.  
237 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (“[the statute] violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and [another] Amendment cannot save legislation prohibited by the 
subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment”).  
239Shay, supra note 132, at 598.   
238 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that religion would presumably 
be among the classifications deserving of heightened scrutiny) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982)). 
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Missouri’s “high wall” argument would not pass muster under any 
standard above rational basis.  
B.  Adopting Justice White’s Framework for an Equal 
Protection Analysis 
If the Supreme Court does decide to analyze Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution under the Equal Protection 
Clause, it should seek guidance from the framework Justice White 
articulated in his concurring opinion in McDaniel.239  First, because 
this provision places an absolute prohibition on an entire 
classification of religious institutions from receiving state benefits—
similar to how the Tennessee Constitution placed an absolute 
prohibition on clergy members from participating in Tennessee’s 
constitutional convention240—the Court must ascertain the purpose 
behind the legislation by carefully analyzing the interests the state is 
attempting to advance through its enforcement.241  Here, Missouri has 
made it clear that the purpose for this constitutional provision is to 
maintain as strict of a separation between church and state as 
possible.242  It argued that this longstanding state tradition of 
maintaining a “high wall” of separation has prevented impermissible 
entanglement issues that could arise from the government distributing 
public tax dollars to religious institutions.243 
Second, the Court must analyze the classification scheme 
created by the provision.244 Here, Missouri’s constitutional provision 
that prohibits all churches and religious institutions from receiving 
state aid establishes two broad classifications: 1) religious institutions 
and 2) non-religious institutions.  Because the purpose of this 
provision advanced by the state is to prevent all potential 
entanglement issues between church and state, if the Court adheres to 
Justice White’s analysis in McDaniel, it would have to determine 
whether this wholesale exclusion of religion sweeps too broadly to 
serve that purpose.245 In evaluating the classification schemes that are 
 
239 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643.   
240 Id. at 645.  
241 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. L. 
REV. 341, 346 (1949) [hereinafter “Tussman”].  
242 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 784.  
243 Id. at 783.  
244 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645.  
245 Id. 
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created when a statute treats different individuals differently, there 
are several situations that may arise, and the Court will analyze each 
one to determine whether the legislation is constitutional. 
If the provision creates a class that is overinclusive, it would 
mean that individuals and institutions are being excluded from a 
public benefits program where their inclusion would not result in 
detriment to the interest being advanced by the state.246  If the 
classification is a perfect fit, it would mean that the state has created a 
scheme that effectively includes all of the individuals and institutions 
in the program that would not cause a detriment to the state’s interest 
and has excluded the parties that would cause the state detriment in 
achieving purpose of the legislation.247  The closer the classification 
comes to becoming a perfect misfit, meaning that the classification 
scheme includes or excludes too many individuals that should or 
should not be placed in the classification, the more likely the Court 
will find the provision to be unconstitutional.248 
Finally, the Court must determine whether the classification is 
suspect, requiring the Missouri Constitution to be scrutinized under a 
heightened standard of review than rational basis.249  If the Court 
determines that a religious classification in this context is a suspect 
class, then the Court will apply strict scrutiny, placing the burden on 
the state to demonstrate that the provision is narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest.250  If the Court rejects an 
application of strict scrutiny and instead chooses to apply an 
intermediate standard of review, it will require the state to prove that 
the absolute prohibition of religious organizations from receiving 
state aid is substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.251  If the Court rejects applying at least some level of 
heightened scrutiny, it will apply rational basis which would uphold 
the absolute prohibition against religion so long as the prohibition is 
rationally related to the legitimate government interest.252  For the 
reasons stated above, strict scrutiny should be applied in this case.  
 
246 Id.  
247 Tussman, supra note 241, at 347-49. 
248 Tussman, supra note 241, at 351.  
249 City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303.  
250 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (defining strict 
scrutiny).  
251 Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984) (defining intermediate scrutiny).  
252 See Williamson, 346 U.S. at 488.  
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C.  The Analysis of Article I, Section 7 Under Each 
Standard of Review 
Under strict scrutiny, even if it is conceded that maintaining a 
strict separation of church and state is a compelling state interest, a 
blanket prohibition against the distribution of funds to religious 
organizations is not narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling 
interest.  The provision in the Missouri Constitution sweeps too 
broadly,253 prohibiting state action that will never result in 
entanglement issues.  In other words, the classification that this 
provision establishes is overinclusive because even though there are 
many examples where distributing state funds to churches for certain 
purposes would cause the precise entanglement issues that the state is 
attempting to avoid, there are just as many instances where excluding 
churches from these public benefits programs would not advance the 
interests of the state.  For example, Trinity argued that a literal 
reading of the Missouri Constitution would prohibit churches from 
receiving public benefits from state police and fire departments, even 
if they were called to the church to respond to emergency situations 
because these departments are funded by taxpayer dollars and its 
action in a church would technically be classified as distributing 
public aid to a religious organization.254  It also contended that such a 
broad prohibition would allow the state to enact legislation that 
would permit high occupancy vehicles to have certain toll charges 
waived while crossing bridges but exclude church buses from 
receiving that same benefit.255 Although Missouri’s Department of 
Natural Resources adequately rebutted these extreme hypotheses,256 if 
the state could deny a religious organization a scrap-tire grant, it is 
not so farfetched to believe that states might try to expand that 
holding to other common benefits as well.     
When the Founders expressed concerns over the federal 
government endorsing the beliefs of a particular religion, they 
certainly could not have believed that all interactions between state 
actors and religious institutions would constitute the sponsorship of 
 
253 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645 (White, J., concurring).  
254 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 37-39. 
255 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 39. 
256 Brief in Opposition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Trinity, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 15-577).  
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religion.257  It is not likely that the early American Colonies would 
have feared that a church’s participation in a state-funded scrap-tire 
grant program would have resulted in a symbolic union between 
church and state.  If this were the case, then there does not seem to be 
a single instance where it would be permissible for a church in any 
state to receive any form of public benefits or state aid.  
Although Missouri may have an interest in preventing the 
commingling between church and state in some instances, it should 
not be able to exclude qualified religious organizations from 
participating in all public benefits programs.  The Eighth Circuit in 
Trinity failed to recognize that churches have historically been an 
integral part of society in bringing communities together and 
providing a safe haven for society’s most troubled individuals.  More 
importantly, the people who worship in these churches and bring 
their children to these religious daycare centers have a 
constitutionally protected right to do so.  Excluding a church from a 
public scrap-tire program for no other reason than the fact that it is a 
church does nothing more than restrict the ability of families 
attending the church to allow their children to fully enjoy their 
experience on a safe playground. 
Even under an intermediate standard of review, the 
“wholesale exclusion” of religious organizations from public benefits 
programs would not be substantially related to the important 
government interest of preventing the commingling of church and 
state.  Although prohibiting churches from participating in some 
benefits programs might be substantially related to that interest, a 
blanket prohibition against participation in all programs cannot be 
substantially related to advance that interest.  For example, if a public 
assistance program was distributing public funds to help renovate 
existing buildings for qualified organizations, there would likely be 
an issue if a church was able to receive these funds and build a new 
campus or repair an outdated sanctuary.  Likewise, if state funds were 
distributed directly to individuals to help train them to become 
members of the clergy, then this exclusion of religious institutions 
from the benefits program would be more than justified.258  However, 
these types of situations have not been presented in this case and it is 
clear that preventing a church from resurfacing the playground of a 
 
257 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.  
258 See Locke, 540 U.S at 712.  
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child daycare center cannot be construed as having a substantial 
relation to an important government interest of preventing 
entanglement issues between church and state.259   
It is clear that under either heightened standard of review, 
Missouri’s historic interest in maintaining a high wall between 
church and state would not be enough to satisfy a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection analysis.  It is critical to emphasize the 
fact that even if a regulation is valid under one provision of the 
Constitution, that regulation must be struck down once it violates 
another provision.260  In Trinity, even though the lower court held that 
the challenged legislation did not violate the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause, it does not mean the Court can ignore the fact 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was 
violated.261 Had the Eighth Circuit fully analyzed Trinity’s claim and 
placed Equal Protection at the forefront of the analysis, and applied 
any standard of review above rational basis, Trinity would have 
likely won the case because it is clear that placing a blanket 
prohibition on qualified religious institutions from participating in an 
entirely secular recycling grant program sweeps too broad.262 
Although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the application of 
rational basis to Trinity’s Equal Protection Clause claim because it 
could not find a violation of the First Amendment religion clauses,263 
the Supreme Court likely will not apply traditional rational basis in 
this case.  Rational basis is a test that is typically reserved for 
classifications bases on age, wealth, sexual orientation, or disability 
status,264 whereas religion, although rarely brought up in the context 
of Equal Protection discussions, will likely be deserving of receiving 
heightened review.265  
The Court has in fact used strict scrutiny to evaluate state 
action which places restrictions on an individual’s First Amendment 
 
259 See Trinity, 788 F.3d at 793 (Gruender, J., dissenting in part) (“[A] this stage of the 
litigation, I cannot conclude that the Department’s concern about direct funding for a rubber 
playground surface translates into a historic and substantial antiestablishment concern.). 
260 See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.  
261 Id.  
262 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645.  
263 Trinity, 788 F.3d at 788-89.  
264 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
265 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that although not at issue in the 
case, religion would presumably be among the classifications deserving of heightened 
scrutiny).  
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right to freely exercise his or her religion.266 For example, in Church 
of the Lukumi Babaku Aya,267 the majority of the Court applied a 
strict scrutiny standard to strike down an ordinance which prevented 
members of the Santeria religion from partaking in rituals that 
required the slaughtering animals as sacrificial offerings to their 
God.268  Even though the ordinance was facially neutral and did not 
mention the Santeria religion, a review of the legislative history of 
the ordinance made it clear to the Court that members of the local 
church were specifically being targeted for their beliefs.269  It stated 
that only in the rarest cases would a  “law that targets religious 
conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate 
governmental interests only against conduct with a religious 
motivation . . . survive strict scrutiny.”270 However, despite the 
Court’s recognition that this type of state action is invidious at its 
core, it routinely disposes of Equal Protection arguments under a 
rational basis standard of review whenever the First Amendment tests 
have been satisfied.271 
The Court rarely proceeds with an Equal Protection analysis 
after it has already evaluated a religion case under the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses. Therefore, if the Court engages in an 
Equal Protection analysis and applies any level of heightened 
scrutiny, it is very likely that it will conclude that the wholesale 
exclusion of religion from public benefits programs does not serve to 
advance the interests of the state, and only results in the type of 
invidious discrimination prohibited by the Constitution.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  This Nation was founded on a guarantee that an individual’s 
religious liberty would be zealously protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.272 Although the Supreme Court has overwhelmingly 
ensured that these fundamental rights have not been encroached upon 
by the state, some individuals and religious organizations fall victim 
 
266 See Church of the Lukumi Babaku Aya, 508 U.S. at 520.  
267 Id. at 522.  
268 Id. at 520.  
269 Id.  
270 Id. at 546.  
271 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). 
272 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50.   
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to an analytical framework failing to provide them with justice.273  
These unfortunate outcomes are the result of the Court’s longstanding 
tradition of engaging exclusively in First Amendment analyses 
whenever religious issues are present—utilizing tests which have 
been criticized as providing inadequate and inconsistent results274—
and failing to address state conduct that potentially violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.275   
In instances where the state refuses to allow qualified 
churches and religiously affiliated individuals to participate in 
generally available, secular public benefits programs, even when it is 
conceded that issuing the funds would not result in impermissible 
entanglement issues,276 the Court must treat the type of action as 
invidious discrimination, as the state is excluding these qualified 
participants solely on the basis of religion.277 As Justice White has 
explained, reviewing this type of discrimination under an Equal 
Protection framework would help to identify serious constitutional 
concerns since the classification scheme created by the state is 
overinclusive,278 failing to advance the purported legitimate interests 
of the state.  
If the Court upholds Missouri’s absolute prohibition of 
distributing state aid to religious organizations, under any 
constitutional theory, the results could be dire.  Although the extreme 
hypotheticals proposed by Trinity would never likely become reality, 
especially given the state of the current political climate, a holding in 
favor of Missouri could arguably give states an opportunity to begin 
strengthening the wall between church and state.279 Upholding 
Missouri’s constitutional provision would be a significant departure 
from the Court’s increasing willingness to accept and overlook the 
naturally occurring interactions that arise between religious 
organizations and state agencies when public aid programs are 
implemented to help children receive the best education possible.280  
Furthermore, it would certainly give states the opportunity engage in 
 
273 See Trinity, 788 F.3d at 793 (Gruender, J., dissenting in part).  
274 See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
275 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring).  
276 Trinity, 788 F.3d. at 784.  
277 Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 284 (1st Cir. 2005).  
278 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645.  
279 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 37-39. 
280 See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Everson, 330 U.S. at 1. 
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the type invidious discrimination against religion which is prohibited 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
As Justice Stevens has proclaimed, “There is only one Equal 
Protection Clause.”281  If the Supreme Court properly invokes it to 
evaluate the absolute prohibition of religious organizations from 
being afforded an opportunity to receive the same benefits as their 
next door neighbor, it will certainly provide justice the parents and 




281 Craig, 429 U.S. at 211. 
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